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Abstract—Most electronic voting systems in use today provide
printouts so called voter verifiable paper audit trails (VVPATs).
Voters are supposed to verify these before they put them into
the ballot box in order to detect election fraud. A number of
studies have shown that voters are unlikely to do so when using
current systems. Thus, it is very likely that malicious electronic
voting systems print the wrong candidates without being detected.
We introduce precautionary behavior by providing voters with
“just in time” instructions while ensuring that these instructions
cannot be manipulated by a malicious electronic voting system.
Our approach is evaluated in a user study, showing a highly
significant increase in the number of voters that verify, as they
found the manipulation we introduced in the printouts for the
study.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic voting systems have been introduced in the
second half of the 20th century, offering the promise of
making the tallying process faster and less error prone. As
technology advanced, direct electronic voting systems (DREs)
were introduced to support visually impaired voters and to
prevent unintentionally invalid cast votes. DREs enable vote
casting on a computer that stores the accumulated votes and
outputs them at the end of the election day.
Despite the advantages, their security and trustworthiness
is controversial. Manipulations are very difficult to detect, if
at all. As such, the Netherlands and Germany (among others)
have stopped using them. Many states in the U.S. now require
that DREs provide human-readable printouts (so called voter
verifiable paper audit trails) to address this problem. These
printouts reflect voter intent and are deposited into the ballot
box either automatically by the DRE (used by Avante and
Diebold) or manually by the voter [1], [2], [3] and [4]. They
enable election officials to audit the tallying, i.e. depending on
the electoral regulation of the state, in more or less polling
stations the printouts are manually tallied and the results
are compared with the corresponding results output of the
electronic voting system.
However, the printouts only enable fraud detection if voters
actually verify their printout, before these are deposited into
the ballot box. Therefore, the larger the number of voters that
verify the more likely it is that fraud is detected. Unfortunately,
several research studies show that voters are unlikely to verify
their printout when using current systems, independent of
including instructions in the election material for verifying
printouts [5], [6] and [7]. Thus, there is an indispensable
need to encourage precautionary behavior when relying on
electronic voting systems.
The goal of our research is to introduce precautionary
behavior by temporarily diverting voter attention from casting
to verifying their printout. We focus on those systems in
which voters manually deposit printouts into the ballot box
outside the voting booth. Our idea is to divert voter attention
by confronting them with visual and short instructions in
the appropriate position at the appropriate time. Furthermore,
we consider malicious electronic voting systems that would
display a correct review screen to the voters, but manipulate
the printouts. By considering malicious voting systems, we
are restricted regarding adequate solutions because displaying
the instructions to verify by the DRE might be promising
from a usability perspective but is inadequate from a security
perspective: a malicious DRE would not only manipulate
printouts, but may also display incorrect or no instructions
to verify. Another challenge is diverting voter attention from
verifying back to the next step in the vote casting process,
namely folding the printout (in cases where no manipulations
occur) before leaving the voting booth to ensure vote secrecy.
In order to address both challenges we propose the use
of printouts with pre-printed verification instructions. Once
printed, the voter first sees the instructions (to verify and fold)
and then needs to turn the printout, in order to verify its
content. We evaluated this approach in a user study, comparing
it to integration of the same instructions in the election
material. The focus of the evaluation lies on integrity, i.e.
detecting manipulated printouts. The results of our study show
that integrating pre-printed instructions on the printout signif-
icantly increases the number of voters verifying and finding
the manipulation we introduced in the printout. Furthermore,
the instructions seem not to prevent voters from folding the
printout.
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This work is structured as follows: Section II is dedicated
to related usability research on electronic voting. In Section
III the general concepts and the functionality of the ad-
dressed electronic voting systems are introduced. Afterwards,
in Section IV, we describe the methodology for developing an
adequate stimulus to temporarily divert voter attention from
their main task (casting the printout) to verifying their printout
and back to folding the printout. The study design to evaluate
the stimulus effectiveness is explained in Section V and the
results of this study are described and discussed in Section
VI. Section VII concludes this work and leads future research
into several directions.
II. RELATED WORK
In a survey conducted by MacNamara et al. [8], 700
of 1015 participants thought printouts (voter verifiable audit
trails) are important. However, a number of studies have shown
that most voters do not verify the printouts: In the lab study
conducted by Cohen [6] participants were asked to follow a
voting agenda1, and were provided with instructions regarding
the voting system in the voting booth. Only two of 36 partici-
pants detected any of the three types of manipulations (namely
changing a vote to a different candidate, removing a vote from
a candidate or a complete race) introduced in the printout.
Further, Selker et al. [9] reports that in the “Arlington Voter
Verification Study”, only six of 35 participants verified the
printouts. Thereby, participants were provided with instructions
and verbal explanation regarding the voting system outside the
voting booth, and the manipulations were similar to the one
used by Cohen [6]. We acknowledge the problems identified
by Whiteny et al. [10] regarding Selker et al.’s study design [9]
which weakens the presented results. However, we mention it
here as the trend not to verify printouts remains.
Other researchers report similar results but not based on
reported detected manipulations in the printouts but based on
their observation regarding the time participants spent with the
verification step: Herrnson et al. [7] conducted a user study
with more than 1400 participants. Before voting participants
were asked to read a voting agenda. As a result of their study,
authors state that most of the participants seem to ignore the
printouts at all. The Center for American Politics and Citizen-
ship conducted a similar user study in which they provided
participants an overview of the verification mechanism, and
in particular required them to pay attention to the verification
step. They also report that most of the 815 participants did not
spend the necessary time to verify all selections [5]. All these
results motivate our own research.
III. BACKGROUND
We outline the general concepts and functionality of the
electronic voting systems we address in this work by describ-
ing the system proposed by Volkamer et al. [4]. Many other
electronic voting systems, for example [1], [2], [3] and [11]
etc., are based on the same general concepts.
1A voting agenda refers to a pre-defined list of specific candidate(s) or a
specific party.
A. Vote Casting Process
In the vote casting process the voter first identifies herself
to the poll workers, similar to traditional paper-based system.
Afterwards, the voter enters the voting booth and uses the
electronic voting device to prepare the printout (ballot) by
selecting candidates. When the voter confirms the selected
candidates, the electronic voting device starts the printing
process. The printout which contains the selections of the
voter consists of two parts: a human-readable and a machine-
readable part, namely a QR-Code. The QR-Code contains the
exact information as the human-readable part, and it serves and
enables an automatic tallying of printouts. The voter verifies
that the human-readable part contains the candidates selected
on the voting device. Finally, the voter folds the printout, leaves
the voting booth and deposits the printout into the ballot box.
The vote casting process is shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Steps in the vote casting process.
B. Tallying Process
In the tallying process poll workers, where similar to the
paper-based system the four-eyes principle is deployed, first
open the sealed ballot box, and verify that the number of
printouts (ballots) matches the number of voters. Afterwards,
the poll workers start counting, by scanning the printouts one
by one. Thus, they scan the QR-Code and verify that its
content, shown on a monitor, matches the human-readable part
of the printout. After the poll workers verify and confirm that
the content on the human-readable part matches the content on
the QR-Code, the scanned printout is added to the intermediate
result, shown on a second monitor. The tallying process, for
scanning/counting the printouts is shown in Figure 2.
As the election result is based on counting/auditing the
printouts, it is very important that voters verify the content of
the printouts, in order to detect a malicious voting device and
ensure vote integrity and the integrity of the election result.
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Fig. 2. Steps in the tallying process.
IV. STIMULUS: INSTRUCTIONS, POSITION, TIMING
In this section, we describe the methodology for developing
an adequate stimulus to temporarily divert voter attention from
their main task (casting the printout) to verifying their printout.
A. Instructions
The instruction design is based on established research
result: pictures and short sentences are used for better reading
comprehension [12], and keywords are underlined and set
in bold to improve information cognition [13]. Furthermore,
instructions were set in a logical order and written in plain
language, based on the guidelines recommended in [14], [15],
and [16]. During pre-tests the instructions were iteratively
improved, leading to a design consisting of two pictures
accompanied by two main sentences (one for verifying and
one for folding) and one auxiliary sentence, see Figure 3.2 No
word were emphasized in the auxiliary sentence, in order to
not weaken the effect of the two main sentences.
Note that even though our focus lies on integrity of the
vote, we included the second step after printing for controlling
that the instructions do not cause that voters forget to fold their
printout and thereby, accidentally, violate vote secrecy.
Fig. 3. Instructions for verifying the printouts (English translation).
B. Position and Timing
According to Nielsen?s [17], “Instructions [..] should be
visible or easily retrievable whenever appropriate”. In the
2The pictures were developed with the help of an external designer.
context of electronic voting Redish et al. [15] recommend
that “Instructions must come “just in time” – when voters
need them”. This indicates that instructions for verifying the
printouts should be provided during the vote casting process
(and not only included in the election material). Displaying
the instructions on the DRE screen, e.g. when the printing
process start is inappropriate: a malicious DRE might not
only manipulate the printout, but could also display incorrect
instructions, e.g. “Thank you for voting. Deposit the printout
into the ballot box.”. Similar problems might occur if the
instructions are printed by the DRE on the printout. Thus,
we needed to provide the instructions without relying on the
trustworthiness of the DRE and/or of the printer.
In order to identify the appropriate position and time we
conducted a number of pre-tests with different approaches:
posters on the screen, posters on the printer, front of the
printout and reverse of the printout. We observed the behavior
of participants during the pre-tests and carried out some
informal interviews afterwards. Based on these results, the
most promising approach, followed up in the user study, was
participants (voters) first seeing the instructions on the printout,
then turning the printout in order to verify its content. This had
a positively surprising effect. The integration of the instructions
in the vote casting process is shown in Figure 4 and animated
in a video, which can be watched under the following link:
http://tinyurl.com/oa94caj.
Fig. 4. Pre-printed instructions and their integration.
Note that the pre-prints are trusted because it is assumed
that the poll workers insert them into the printer during the
election setup phase.
V. STUDY DESIGN
In this section we first explain why a cover story is neces-
sary for evaluating the proposed stimulus and what criteria the
cover story needs to meet. Then, we describe the cover story,
experimental design, procedures and setup of our user study.
We also report about recruiting and sampling of participants.
A. Preliminary Considerations
The general challenge in the area of usable security is
that you cannot tell participants the primary goal of the study
without biasing them [18]. Knowing the purpose of the study
changes participants’ behavior, such that they may act in a
manner perceived as appropriate [19]. Thus, in our study
participants might verify the printout (study goal), while this
does not imply that they do so in a real election. In order to
avoid such an effect, the communicated goal of the user study
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cannot be about the verification of the printout. Therefore,
an appropriate method has to be considered for deceiving
participants regarding the goal of our user study.
In addition, reliable results cannot be achieved through
self-reported answers, and instead will require manipulation
of the printouts. Due to legal and ethical concerns around
manipulation, the study cannot be conducted during a legally
binding election. An alternative might be to simulate an
election. However, in an election simulation voters are likely to
select those candidates they would also select in a real election
which might lead to violation of vote secrecy. Thus, if a
participant identifies the manipulation, and reveals the name of
the selected candidate that was replaced (due to manipulating
the printout), we would violate vote secrecy. Therefore, the
user study cannot simulate an election. Last but not least, par-
ticipants could be provided with a voting agenda, but then the
printout has no personal relevance to them (compared to their
vote in an election).3 Thus, the simulation of an election with a
voting agenda, is also not appropriate for the research question
we address in this work, because the printout must have a
personal relevance for the participants. Asking participants
personal, sensitive information would introduce a personal
relevance to the printout. But, similar to election simulation,
we would violate participant’s privacy, if a participant identifies
the manipulation, and reveals the information that was replaced
(due to manipulating the printout). Thus, asking participants
personal, sensitive information cannot be considered. Based on
these requirements, we developed the following cover story, as
the appropriate method for deceiving participants.
We are aware that related works, e.g. [5], [6] and [7], have
simulated elections to evaluate whether voters verify or not
the printouts (in terms of voter verifiable paper audit trails).
However, as outlined in this section, an election simulation
has more disadvantages with respect to evaluating the stimulus
than the approach presented in this work.
B. Cover Story
The cover story we used in our user study is the following:
The participants were told that they are taking part in a memory
study which tests what type of information (e.g. numbers or
names) people can better remember after having read a short
text. After the reading task, participants were asked to give
their answers on a computer, which provided them with a
printout. Participants were told that evaluation is based on the
answers on the printout they provide to the experimenter.
This cover story meets all requirements identified in the
previous section. The primary goal of our study is com-
pletely hidden to the participants to avoid any effect caused
by such knowledge. The stimulus is not evaluated within a
voting scenario or by asking participants for personal, sensitive
information. The printout can be manipulated without any
concerns. Furthermore, the cover story ensures the following
similar criteria regarding elections (1) Selections are made on
an electronic device and printed. (2) Participants were told
3Note that we focus on the German federal elections, where voting is not
compulsory. Therefore, we postulate that cast votes have a personal relevance
for voters. However, as elections differ from country to country and some are
compulsory, this might negatively influence voters’ personal relevance with
respect to their cast vote. Hence, this needs to be considered when designing
user studies.
that they will be evaluated according to the results on their
respective printout, thus introducing a personal relevance to
the printout.
C. Experimental Design and Procedure
The study consisted of two groups: The control group got
instructions as part of the experiment guidelines, simulating
voters getting instructions for verifying the printout in the
election material. The study group got the same instructions,
but as part of the printout, simulating voters getting the
instructions during the vote casting process.
The main goal of the user study is to analyze the effect of
the stimulus on participants’ awareness of and performance of
verifying. In addition, we observed whether participants folded
their printout. Correspondingly, the dependent variables were
“awareness”, “detection” and “folded”. To measure “aware-
ness” a post-questionnaire was developed. To measure “detec-
tion” the printout was manipulated and the study supervisor
noted whether participants reported a problem. He also noted
the state of printout when handed over to measure “folded”.
The independent variable consisted of the position and time of
the instructions.
Each participant had to pass through eight sequential
phases: First, each participant was provided with written ex-
periment guidelines. The guidelines explained the cover story
and the procedure of the experiment. In the second phase
participants received a short (160 words) text about Alan
Turing. Participants had three minutes to read and memorize
the text. They were not allowed to take notes. Afterwards,
participants had unlimited time to answer questions on the
computer. For each of the 15 questions, three possible answers
were provided.4 The participants had to answer all questions in
order to proceed to printing. After participants confirmed the
review screen, printing was started and the computer screen
only displayed “Printing...”. The selected answers were no
longer displayed, similar to the process in the voting systems
we consider in this work. Thus, after printing and by following
the instructions (on the printout or in the election material),
participants should verify their answers on the printout from
memory. In case participants detected and reported the manipu-
lation, the study supervisor asked about the type of problem to
make sure it was about the error we introduced in the printout.
After the participant explained the specific error, the study
supervisor told the participant that he would “take note of the
problem” and participants were encouraged to continue with
the procedure in order to collect uniform and complete data.
While participants handed the printouts to the experimenter,
he took a note whether a participant folded the printout. In the
next phase, the participants filled in the post-questionnaire.
At the end of the experiment participants were debriefed and
asked to not talk about the experiment with other persons, in
order to avoid biasing other potential participants.
D. Experimental Setup
The setup used in the experiment is shown in Figure 5.
Thereby, participants answered the questions on a computer,
which logged all final answers. The quiz application was
4We included 15 questions, because this was the approximate number of
parties in the last federal election in Germany.
4
programed in Visual Basic for Applications for PowerPoint
2010. The instructions for verifying the printout, refer to Figure
3 in Section IV, were adapted to the cover story by replacing
“all selections” with “all answers” and “poll worker” with
“study supervisor”. Participants of the control group were
confronted with the blank side of the printout. This excludes
turning of the printout as the cause for verifying its content in
the study group.
Fig. 5. Setting in the experiment.
E. Manipulation
We decided to manipulate the answer in the middle of the
printout, as people in general are more likely to verify the
first and the last items. Furthermore, we wanted to introduce
a manipulation that is easy to detect, similar to changing the
name of a candidate. Question seven “When was Alan Truing
born?” seemed adequate regarding these requirements. The
provided answers were 1910, 1911 and 1912, and independent
from the answer given by the participant on the computer, 1845
was printed. We used 1845 for manipulating the printout, e.g.
instead of 1921, because changing a candidate name implies
changing at least a couple of characters.
F. Post-questionnaire
The post-questionnaire measured the following two ques-
tions using a five-point Likert scale anchored in “strongly
disagree” and “strongly agree”: (1) “I was aware that I should
verify the correctness of all answers on the printout.” (in order
to evaluate the participants’ awareness) (2) “I have verified
the correctness of all answers on the printout.” (in order to
compare self-reported answers with reactions). In addition, the
questionnaire collected some demographic data (sex, age, and
background).
G. Ethical Considerations
An ethics commission at our university provides ethical
requirements for research involving humans. These require-
ments were met; all participants read and confirmed the
experimental guidelines, which stated that all data would be
stored anonymously and serve only for the purpose of the
experiment.
H. Recruiting and Sample
The participants were recruited via E-Mail and by personal
contact. In the experiment participated 65 subjects (34 female,
41 male) at the age of 19-58 years. The sample consists of
40 students from different subjects, including psychologists,
computer scientists, mechanical engineers, political scientists
and architects; as well as 25 employees. The employees
are classified as follows: academics of different levels (e.g.
Dip., M.Sc., PhD) of their career, civil servants, freelancers,
administrative technical staff members, caretakers, and event
managers.
In order to control the effect of the stimulus, we decided
to run an enhanced study group, i.e. to have more participants
in the study group. For the study participants were randomly
divided into two groups. In the study-group, we had 39
participants (20 female, 19 male) between 19-54 years, thereof
26 students and 13 employees. While in the control group,
we had 26 participants (14 female, 12 male) between 21-
58 years, thereof 14 students and 12 employees. The size of
the control group with 26 participants consists of a sufficient
number of participants allowing robust statistical test to be
carried out according to Lazar et al. [20]. Furthermore, we had
two different compensations for the participants for motivating
them to take part in our study. The psychology students are
required from their department to participate in user studies
for a specific amount of hours. Thus, in cooperation with
the psychology department we compensated them with the
appropriate amount of credits regarding our study. For the rest
of the participants we provided a 20e Amazon voucher. The
voucher was randomly assigned to one of the participants from
the group of participants that answered all questions correctly.
Note that all participants were naive, in scientific matter,
towards the study. Furthermore, participants were only used to
the paper-based voting system. Electronic voting systems were
only very rarely used in Germany and only until 2005. The
use of electronic voting systems in Germany for parliamentary
elections has stopped with the introduction of the principle of
“public nature of elections” by the German Federal Constitu-
tional Court in 2009 [21], as the systems used until 2005 do
not comply with this principle. In addition the experimenter
was not known to research on security or electronic voting.
VI. RESULT AND DISCUSSION
In order to measure the effect of the stimulus we evaluated
the dependable variables, namely “detection”, “folded” and
“awareness”. Participants of the study group detected the
manipulation more frequently with 77% compared to 19%
of participants from the control group. This includes all
participants who detected and reported the manipulation to the
study supervisor from the “voting booth”, and continued with
the procedure. In both groups all participants who detected
the manipulation had selected the correct answer (at the
quiz application). The percentage of people verifying based
on instructions provided in the election material (i.e. in the
experimental guidelines) is similarly low to those reported
in early research. Note that in an real election scenario the
number of people verifying the printout might be higher for
both groups.
The evaluation of the second dependable variable shows
that 90% of the study group participants folded the printout,
in contrast to 27% of participants from the control group. This
result indicates that the instructions did not distract participants
from folding the printout. Further, we calculated a chi-square
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test over the dependable variables “detection” and “folded” to
test their empirical relevance. For the variable “detection” the
chi-quadrat-test returned a value of χ2=(1, N=65)=20.89 and
a p-Value of p < 0.01. Similarly, for the variable “folded” the
chi-quadrat-test returned a value of χ2=(1, N=65)=26.93, p <
0.01. This results in a highly significant difference between
both groups.
Additionally, we compared the mean of the answers to the
awareness question for both groups. The descriptive statistics
show that the study group was more aware of verifying the
printout (control group x̄ = 4.038; study group x̄ = 4.837).
A Mann-Whitney significance test (U(330.5)p < 0.006)) over
the variable “awareness” was computed and showed that both
groups differ significantly on how aware the participants were
that they should verify the printout. Furthermore, a Pearson test
shows that no correlation exists between verifying the printout
age, education and gender respectively. We also evaluated the
self-reported answers for both groups and compared them
with the actual participants reaction, i.e. whether they actually
detected the manipulation. In total 30 participants did not
detect and report the error in the printout. However, all of them
stated in the post-questionnaire to have verified the printout.
This shows that it is necessary to trick participants as the
self-reported statements are not reliable. Finally, we evaluated
whether the different compensations affected the dependable
variable “detection“. The χ2=(1, N=65)=2.52, p > 0.188 shows
that there is no significant difference between both groups,
namely the psychology students and all other participants.
The results of our study show that all dependent variables
“detection”, “folded” and “awareness” are significantly higher
in the study group than in the control group. This indicates
that the proposed stimulus is a promising solution towards im-
proving precautionary behavior in verifiable electronic voting
systems.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
There is no doubt that by using current electronic voting
systems, election integrity is only ensured, if voters verify their
printouts. Current research, for example [5] and [7], show
that voters are not very likely to do so. This is a crucial
issue even in countries with established democracy, like the
U.S., Germany, U.K. etc. Therefore, it is very important to
understand why voters are not very likely to verify their
printouts and to motivate them to do so (of course without
scaring them). Thus, in this work we developed an adequate
stimulus to temporarily divert voter attention from their main
task (putting the printout into the ballot box) to verifying
their printout. The results of our work show that the proposed
stimulus which is displayed and pre-printed on the printout
(voter verifiable paper audit trail) is a promising solution
towards motivating voters to verify.
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